

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00118 01 OF 02 221843Z

41

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0118

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 22, 1976
(SALT TWO - 984)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 22, 1976.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 22, 1976

I

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THE
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN ARTICLE XVI--ON VERIFICATION OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS--HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN
DETAIL. THE FACT THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS
BEING ASSUMED BY THE SIDES WILL BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
PILLARS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WHICH MUST EMBODY THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00118 01 OF 02 221843Z

UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN OUR TWO STATES IN

VLADIVOSTOK. MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE IS REFLECTED IN A CLEAR-CUT MANNER IN THE AGREED PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVI OF THE JOINT DRAFT, WHICH ESTABLISH, IN PARTICULAR, THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, EACH SIDE SHALL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THAT EACH SIDE UNDERTAKES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE, OPERATING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 1 OF THIS ARTICLE.

IN ARTICLE XVI ONLY A PART OF PAR. 3 STILL REMAINS UNAGREED. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED CONCERNING THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES, CONTAINED IN PAR. 3 OF THAT ARTICLE, NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 3, ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS, AT THE FEBRUARY 3, 1976 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, SET FORTH A NEW CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO THE LANGUAGE CONCERNING DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES AND EXPRESSED ITS CONSENT TO HAVE IT ADOPTED AS AN AGREED STATEMENT OF THE SIDES.

AT THE FEBRUARY 18 AND MARCH 10, 1976 MEETINGS THE USSR DELEGATION CITED DETAILED CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT AND EXPLANATION OF ITS PROPOSAL. WE SHOWED IN A WELL-REASONED MANNER THAT THE PROPOSAL TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OBLIGATION NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, AND THE OBLIGATION NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE, PROVIDES THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF THESE MEANS, AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE XVI, AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROVIDING THE SIDES WITH CONFIDENCE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE BEING COMPLIED WITH IN ALL THEIR TOTALITY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00118 01 OF 02 221843Z

COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE XVI, PAR. 3, IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, ADOPTED BY BOTH SIDES, WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF MOVING OUR WORK FORWARD.

II

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE SIDES WERE CLOSE TOGETHER ON THE QUESTION OF WORKING OUT THE DEFINITION OF LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THE RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT.

THE U.S. DELEGATION'S APRIL 14, 1976 STATEMENT REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF DETERMINING WHICH MISSILE LAUNCHERS ARE ICBM LAUNCHERS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SIDES, RELYING ON DATA OBTAINED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, ALREADY HAVE A CLEAR-CUT UNDERSTANDING OF WHICH MISSILE LAUNCHERS ARE ICBM LAUNCHERS. THE EXISTING CERTAINTY IN THIS RESPECT IS NOT OF AN ABSTRACT, THEORETICAL NATURE; IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY ALL OF THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN IMPLEMENTING AND VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN FORCE. THEREFORE, IT IS QUITE NATURAL THAT IN THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT USE WOULD BE MADE OF THE ICBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, IN ADDITION SPECIFYING ICBM RANGE IN KILOMETERS. THIS ADEQUATELY AND QUITE UNAMBIGUOUSLY REFLECTS THE IDENTICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SIDES REGARDING WHICH MISSILE LAUNCHERS ARE LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, AT PRESENT THERE ARE NO DISAGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE SIDES REGARDING PRECISELY SUCH A FORMULATION FOR ARTICLE II, PAR. 1.

WE ALSO NOTE THE CONSIDERATION EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AT THE APRIL 14, 1976 MEETING TO THE EFFECT THAT BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT ICBM LAUNCHERS WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND THAT LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES OF LESS THAN ICBM RANGE WILL NOT.

A CERTAIN PROXIMITY OF THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00118 01 OF 02 221843Z

HAS ALSO EMERGED ON THE QUESTION OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES, TO BE INCORPORATED IN ARTICLE IV, NOT TO CONVERT MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT ICBM LAUNCHERS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS.

AT THE SAME TIME, DIFFERENCES STILL REMAIN ON A NUMBER OF ASPECTS, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE U.S. DELEGATION'S APRIL 14, 1976 STATEMENT.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S APPROACH TO THIS RANGE OF QUESTIONS.

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00118 02 OF 02 221843Z

42

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 118

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TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH BY THE U.S. DELEGATION CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARTICLE II, PAR. 1, AND TO THE RELATED PROVISION ON NON-CONVERSION, TO BE LUDED IN ARTICLE IV, AT THE MARCH 23, 1976 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION STATED THAT IS WAS READY TO PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEFINITION BEING WORKED OUT, ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD CONSIST OF MISSILE LAUNCHERS SPECIALLY DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING LAND-BASED ICBMS.

IN OUR APRIL 7, 1976 STATEMENT WE EXPLAINED THAT TO UNDERSTAND ICBM LAUNCHERS AS BEING LAUNCHERS SPECIALLY DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING LAND-BASEC ICBMS MEANS THAT THE SIDES CAN ONLY HAVE ICBM LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE BEEN SPECIALLY DEVELOPED, AND CONSEQUENTLY TESTED, AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING PRECISELY ICBMS.

AS FOR HOW A DISTINCTION WOULD BE MADE BETWEEN THOSE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THOSE WHICH ARE NOT, THE APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE USSR DELEGATION MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO DRAW SUCH A DISTINCTION IN A SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00118 02 OF 02 221843Z

QUITE DEFINITE AND CLEAR-CUT MANNER BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

THE U.S. DELEGATION'S APRIL 14, 1976 STATEMENT NOTED THAT FEW OF THE DEPLOYED ICBM LAUNCHERS HAVE EVER LAUNCHED AN ICBM. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IT DOES NOT FOLLOW FROM THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE DEFINITION OF ICBM LAUNCHERS THAT ICBM LAUNCHERS SHOULD ONLY CONSIST OF THOSE SPECIFIC DEPLOYED ICBM LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE LAUNCHED LAND-BASED ICBMS. IT IS A MATTER OF COUNTING WITHIN THE MAXIMUM OVERALL 2,400 LEVEL BEING ESTABLISHED ALL THOSE ICBM LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN SPECIALLY DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING LAND-BASED ICBMS.

AT THE APRIL 14, 1976 MEETING THE U.S. DELEGATION AGAIN RAISED THE QUESTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH SUPPOSEDLY "ARE ABLE TO LAUNCH BOTH ICBMS AND MISSILES OF LESS THAN ICBM RANGE."

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF JEDGEMENTS OF THAT KIND. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHSIIZE THE FOLLOWING.

ASSUMING THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONVERT BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT ICBM LAUNCHERS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING LAND-BASED ICBMS, THEN SUCH CONVERSION WOULD BE BANNED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION, TO BE INCLUDED IN ARTICLE IV OF THE DRAFT, NOT TO CONVERT MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT ICBM LAUNCHERS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS. MOREOVER, THIS OBLIGATION WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO EXISTING MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT ICBM LAUNCHERS, AS WELL AS TO LAUNCHERS OF THAT KIND WHICH MIGHT APPEAR IN THE FUTURE. THE BAN ON CONVERTING MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT ICBM LAUNCHERS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS, TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THIS OBLIGATION, WOULD BE FULLY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE SIDES WITH CONFIDENCE THAT THE LIMITATIONS ON LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS CANNOT BE CIRUMVENTED THROUGH WUCH CONVERSATION.

AS FOR VARIOUS KINDS OF HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT ICBM LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS, AS REFERRED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00118 02 OF 02 221843Z

TO IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S APRIL 14, 1976 STATEMENT, THEY ARE BEYOND THE REALM OF WHAT IS REALISTICALLY CONCEIVABLE. UNDER THE APPROACH OF THE SOVIET SIDE THERE COULD NOT BEANY LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS WHICH WERE NOT SPECIALLY DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS. THIS MEANS THAT IF LAUNCHERS ARE DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED

FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS, THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE
NUMBER BEING ESTABLISHED WHICH IS REFERRED TO IN
ARTICLE III, PAR. 1.

SUCH ARE THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH THE USSR DELEGA-
TION BELIEVED NECESSARY TO TOUCH UPON TODAY IN CONNECTION
WITH WORKING OUT A DEFINITION FOR LAND-BASED ICBM
LAUNCHERS AND THE RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT, AND
IN PARTICULAR, IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT WAS SAID BY THE
U.S. DELEGATION AT THE APRIL 14, 1976 MEETING. JOHNSON

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